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PUBLIC CONTROL OF LABOR RELATIONS. By D. 0. Bowman. New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1942. Pp. xi, 500. $5.00.
MR. Bowman's study of the administrative role of the National Labor
Relations Board is in the scholarly tradition of Gerard Henderson's Federal
Trade Commission and I. L. Sharfman's Interstate Commerce Commission.
It summarizes the historical and legislative background of the Board; analyzes
problems raised by the statutory provisions proscribing unfair labor prac-
tices and authorizing certification of representatives; describes with minute
detail the procedure, organization and personnel of the Board; and evaluates
the seven year performance of perhaps the most controversial agency created
under the New Deal.
Many persons have written about the Board on the basis of a few dramatic
episodes. Some have, with pedestrian diligence, taken us on a tour of all
the cases decided under the Act by the Board and by the courts. But Mr.
Bowman has pictured the Board as it appears not only in the law books,
but in anmual reports, briefs, press releases, hearings before Congressional
appropriation committees, hearings before special investigating committees,
Congressional debates, monographs of the Attorney General's Committee on
Administrative Procedure, and comments by labor and employer organiza-
tions. One merit of the method is that it makes available for readers distant
from Washington material which is hidden because it is unindexed and
ephemeral because it is unbound. But there is a greater merit. The story
of the Board emerges in a rounded aspect. The critics and defenders of the
Board make their own speeches. And, like Thucydides, Mr. Bowman for
the most part stands aside, the impartial, detached recorder of their con-
troversies.
His history begins with the federal government's legislation in the rail-
way field. He passes on rapidly through the days of NRA, Senator Wagner's
National Labor Board, and the first National Labor Relations Board consti-
tuted under Public Resolution No. 44, 73d Congress,' until he comes to
the bill which ultimately became the National Labor Relations Act. He
shrewdly observes that "the proponents of the bill visualized the proposed
Board as an independent agency enforcing preventive legislation . . . the
outlawing of the company-dominated union, and the protection of the right
of the individual to organize. There was no evidenced desire to promote
union organization nor even, indeed, to promote collective bargaining nearly
as much as there was the desire to provide protection, to remove barriers,
so that the individual could do as he wished in matters of unionism."2 This
limited view was, according to my recollection, the one held in 1934 by
1. 48 STAT. 1183, c. 677 (June 19, 1934).
2. P. 53. Italics in the original.
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the President,3 by Senator A Valsh4 as Chairman of the Senate Education
and Labor Committee, and by the representatives of the National Labor
Board and the Department of Labor.
However, it is only fair to add that a broader vision of the Act, in-
cluding a primary design to promote collective bargaining, was always ex-
pressed by Mr. Leon Keyserling, the influential secretary to Senator Wagner.
Over the protests of his co-draftsman (who yielded under the mistaken5
belief that it was of no consequence), Mr. Keyserling insisted on inserting
as the first section of the Act a declaration of policy drawn by him which
goes far to favor an interpretation of the law which gives collective bargaining
and unionism not merely a clear field but a preferred position. This ten-
dency was augmented when, upon the suggestion of Messrs. Biddle and
Garrison, 6 there was added to the list of unfair labor practices the fifth
unfair employer practice, "to refuse to bargain collectively with the repre-
sentatives of his employees."'7 And additional changes, made by Mr. Calvert
Magruder and Mr. Philip Levy in their 1935 revision of the bill, support
the view that ultimately the bill's purposes were not only to establish freedom
of choice, but to promote collectivism in labor relations. Thus, the state-
ment in 1937 before the Supreme Court of the United States,8 that the Act
merely promoted freedom of association and freedom of representation,
although sincerely made, now appears disingenuous.
The conflict between the liberal and the collectivist views of the Act has
arisen sharply in many issues before the Board. Mr. Bow-man takes as an
example the notable series of cases where two or more unions compete
for the same workers' votes, and at the first election neither union gets a
majority.9 Under the liberal view, the purpose of the Act is to allow a
worker absolute freedom until such time as a majority of his fellows have
united upon the selection of a representative. This view would lead the
Board to decide that the election just described was a conclusive deternina-
tion that the requisite majority did not exist and freedom of choice remained
unfettered. But the Board rejected this approach. Its view was that the
3. Mly recollection is buttressed by the draft bill, now in my possession, dictated
by the President on June 12, 1934 in the presence of Senator Wagner, Senator Walsh,
Senator Robinson, Speaker Joseph IV. Byrns, Secretary Perkins, Mfr. Richberg, and
myself.
4. The burden of the hearings in 1934 was borne by Senator Walsh. His views
of what the.1934 version of the bill was designed to accomplish were set forth in St=-.
REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 2-3. Other members of the Senate Com-
mittee on Education and Labor were irregular in attendance. Senators Mfurray and
LaFollette were occasionally present. So far as I recollect, Senator Black, as he then
was, never was long in attendance at a public hearing and came only to one of the
private committee sessions.
5. See, for ex\'ample, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177, 203-204 (1941);
NLRB v. Fansteel Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 255, 257 (1939).
6. P. 57. Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 195S,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 79, 136-137.
7. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 158(5) (1940).
8. See argument for the NLRB in Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103, at. 301
U. S. 738-739 (1937); SEx. Doc. No. 52, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 82-8-3.
9. Pp. 142-155.
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most important purpose of the Act was to promote collective bargaining,
not freedom of choice. Therefore, when on the first election one union did
not receive a majority, but two or more unions did receive in combination
a majority of the votes cast, the Board has decided that the election was
inconclusive and has directed run-off elections until one union did receive
a majority. 10 Thus, concrete issues of procedure are determined by abstract
views of policy underlying the Act.
Turning to the NLRB problems that have most excited public opinion,
the alleged interference with freedom of speech and the alleged noxious
combination of the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury, Mr. Bowman is
both informative and dispassionate. His discussion of freedom of speech
might perhaps have benefited from putting the NLRB cases in juxtaposition
with the recent Supreme Court cases considering the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to picketing ordinances." Yet this has been well
done so recently 12 that the omission is not serious. And it is much more
important to have had Mr. Bowman tell us step by step the procedure
followed by the Board to assure fairness of treatment to all parties. In the
light of his exhaustive analysis, there will be few who will quarrel with his
conclusion that "most of the attacks launched against its procedure were in
truth launched against the public policy itself.' 13
10. Mr. Bowman's discussion (pp. 152-155) of run-off elections and of Matter of
R. K. LeBlond Machine Tool Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1940), is not quite current.
In February, 1941, after Chairman Millis took his seat, the queqtion of run-off elctionii
was reopened and the result reaffirmed. It may not be inappropriate for me to refer
to an admittedly partisan brief filed at that time in behalf of United States Smelting,
Refining & Mining Co., 29 N.L.R.B. 426 (1941), which stresses some points not
emphasized by Mr. Bowman. As that brief indicates, the Board's decisions in favor
of run-off elections proceed on what the logicians would call the fallacy "a ditto
secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter." See 1 VINOGRADOFF, HISTORICAL JURISPRUMNCEc
(1920) 5. When bachelor John proposes marriage to Anne and is told he cannot have
her, it does not follow that he will be content to select either Betty or Constance.
He may not have an undifferentiated desire for matrimony. Likewise, if a worker
votes to be represented by an unaffiliated union, it does not follow that if he cannot
have that union he will be content to select between the A. F. or L. and the C.I.O.
He may not [as the record of the NLRB shows (p. 152, n. 25)] have an undifferentiated
desire for collective bargaining.
11. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S.
106 (1940) ; Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941);
A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941) ; Carpenters and Joiners Union of America,
Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722 (1942); Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 802 of Internat. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769
(1942).
12. Riesman, Civil Liberties In a Period of Transition, in 3 PUBLIC PoLIcy 33,
79-81 (Harvard University Graduate School of Public Administration, 1942).
13. P. 482. Indeed the formal procedural safeguards thait surround NLRB cases
are reminiscent of those that surround the almost unworkable Bituminous Coal Con-
servation Act of 1937. In the argument on the constitutionality of that Act [Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 391 (1940)], Mr. Attorney-General Jackson,
as he then was, referring to the elaborate safeguards, provoked from Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes the comment that it was an instance of the "undue process of law."
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In treating intangible aspects of the Board's work Mr. Bowman has been
unusually perceptive. Quite rightly he pays tribute to Mr. Charles Fahy
for the excellence of the legal staff and the legal work of the Board. He
notes that limited appropriations made the Board choose between veteran
hacks who never had earned or learned much and law school neophytes
who had never experienced much either in factories or courts. He believes
that the Board wisely preferred the second alternative, even if that occa-
sionally resulted in the Board's agents displaying the intolerance, the love
of authority, and the desire for letter-perfect compliance, sometimes charac-
teristic of immature officeholders.
It is a pity that a book which is so good is not better. Mr. Bovman has
shown by his citations that he appreciates the value of material to be found
in legal briefs and committee hearings; yet his book ignores the wealth of
material to be found in law reviews, economic journals and political science
reviews. He has diligently scrutinized reports and documents previously
unindexed; yet he himself has been satisfied to put his book on the market
with an index woefully inadequate, without the complete legal citation of
cases, and without anything like the fullness which a bar spoiled by CCH,
Prentice-Hall, and the West Publishing Company has come to think is
standard. He has a healthy sophisticated skepticism as to the claims that
Board members have sometimes made when talking of the practical achieve-
ments of the Act; yet he is unduly impressed by the deceptive record of
the Board's success in the Supreme Court of the United States- (how could
the Board lose often in any law-abiding court when Congress has said that
the Board is subject to reversal only for egregious errors and not for bias,
poor judgment, or belief in incredible testimony?) He has stressed the
places where the NLRB has already begun to function as a labor court and
predicted that the role of the federal government in labor relations will
expand; yet he entirely ignores the last year and a half's experience of the
National Defense Mediation Board and the War Labor Board.
Despite the ambitious title of his book, it would be unfair to treat Mr.
Bowman as if he had tried to do for labor law what 0. W. Holmes did
in the Lowell Lectures for The Common Law, or what Chief Judge Cardozo
did in the Storrs Lectures for The Nature of The Judicial Process. He did
not set himself to express the philosophy of labor law but to paint its detail
in one agency. The walls of administrative law libraries have room for
their Vermeers as well as space for the Leonardos yet to come, and Mr.
Bowman has portrayed the interior of the NLRB with the chiaroscuro, the
microscopic care, and the complete faithfulness of the Dutch painter.
CHARLES E. WYZANSKT, JR.-
-Judge, United States District Court for Mascachusetts.
19421
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
A NEW CONSTITUTION Now. By Henry Hazlitt. New York: Whittelsey
House, 1942. Pp. xiii, 297. $2.50.
ANY initial shock touched off by the startling title of this book is at once
dissipated by the knowledge that the author is an editor of the New York
Tines. A "new constitution" might be something dreadful - an abolition
of the federal system, a regimentation of men and materials, a managerial
revolution, a plan for a socialist commonwealth, a subordination of corporate
enterprise to the general good, a charter for a collectivism of the left or
the right. But it turns out all right; the proposal is one which even the
most die-hard conservative might entertain without public apology. It is
that we confess the error of our ways, renounce our form of government,
and enthrone in its stead the British cabinet system.
If the suggestion is not novel, it is made respectable by the auspices under
which it is now put forward. Mill, Bagehot, and James Bryce have all.
with distinction and charm, said to us, "Why don't you do it the way that
we do it ?" And a number of Americans, with a touch of nostalgia for things
over there, have testified to what an improvement the change would bring.
Henry Hazlitt adds little to the classic arguments which he quotes at length.
The whole political establishment should be under one single high command.
The administration should endure so long as it holds the support of the
country and no longer. A system under which the two Houses fall out
with the Executive or move in different ways is a national hazard. If they
can't pull together, we the people should be able to turn them all out and
start afresh. If to the case for cabinet government the author adds nothing,
he brings to it a superb gift for tinkering.
As a political engineer of sorts Mr. Hazlitt has set out to invent a system
of many devices that can be operated. If two Houses are prone to disagree,
the way to avoid the clash is to get rid of one of them. The Senate, as
the less representative, is obviously the one which must go. Still a check
upon hasty legislative action is a good thing. So why cannot the Single
House create in its likeness a satellite to provide a sober second thought by
holding up a bill for a short period, say sixty days. But, come to think
of it, the smaller states are guaranteed "equal representation" in the tipper
chamber, and there are enough of them to protect themselves in the enjoy-
ment of this ancient privilege. Hence there is nothing for it but to keep
the Senate- and then abate its power until it is just the kind of brake
which is needed. Then a Head of the Government is to be selected, who
is to choose a Cabinet, whose members come generally, but with possible
exceptions, from the legislative body. A Council, to mediate between the
Ministry and Congress, is to be formed by adding to the Cabinet members
of the opposition in the ratio of their numbers to total membership. In
addition to the Prime Minister, there is also to be a President, elected by
the Congress for a long term. He is to perform on state occasions, keep
himself handy for ceremonial use, and as a last resort dissolve a stubborn
legislature. The Cabinet, under the Prime Minister, is to run the political
show; it is to originate all financial and most other measures; bills intro-
duced by the several members are to go to it for review. A proposal can
[Vol. 52
REVIEWS
reach the floor for public debate only after it has been considered by the
Council in executive session. And, lest it be messed up by amendments
passed by men with no unanimity of mind, the power of the House to make
over the measure is severely limited. All is neat and tidy, under a single
command, proof against individual whim and non-sense. The House can
take it and like it- or else revolt and overthrow the administration.
A score of devices are invented to fill in outline and make the scheme go.
The Chief Executive, as we have known him, is cleft in tAvain. The dominant
part of him survives the surgery to become Prime Minister; the recessive
part emerges as the President, new style, who seems to be an edition of
the Crown faded into formalism. With such a creature to strut a general
uselessness, there is of course no further need for a Vice-President. The
veto power goes to the scrap heap; where Cabinet and Congress must be
in accord there is no place for it. The people can choose men, but measures
are intricate and beyond the brain of the voter. So there is no place for
the referendum. The initiative, too, is to be dispensed with; though on
second thought it might be retained to decree checks on the legislature.
An ingenious device enables an M.C. to be recalled and returned to office
at a single election. It is hard to see how any member outside the Cabinet
-submerged as he must be by a well-oiled machine- could ever do any-
thing which provoked resort to the device. The amendment clause of the
Constitution is itself to be amended to make easier the process of amend-
ment. Such are fair samples of the ingenious inventions deemed necessary
to make the apparatus go. It has been a long time since so amazing an
array of political gadgetry has been put on exhibit.
Thus the discussion moves on a routine level far removed from function.
One would expect a consideration of the tasks of a modern government,
a contrivance of devices to do distinctive jobs, an aggregation of instru-
ments into an institution adapted to the American political climate. Yet in
the whole book there is no concern with the spirit of the American Consti-
tution, the conditions under which the political system must operate, the
usages and intangibles which bind it to the society it must serve. The frozen
affair Mr. Hazlitt would foist upon us is not even the living organism which
operates in Great Britain. In office and usage it departs radically from the
model after which it was copied. The House of Lords came into its decadent
political role by way of a series of dramatic incidents. To blueprint the
Senate into its likeness is to disregard the historical process through which so
unique an institution came to be. The course of events beat upon the Crown
to reduce it from a vital to a ceremonial office. To create a functionless
President as its counterpart is to achieve the vestigial by the magic of
apparatus. The King once claimed to rule by divine right; his will found
expression in the acts of his vicars. As Parliament curbed the royal preroga-
tive, it undertook to supply His 'Majesty with his ministers. The primate
among these little by little homed in to reduce the Crown to a ceremonial
office. Our President is quite another sort of potentate; as the people's choice
he represents the general interest far more accurately than a Congress elected
district by district. What England did was to replace an irresponsible monarch
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with a more representative official. What Mr. Hazlitt proposes is to replace
a responsible Executive with a leader further removed from the popular will.
In Great Britain parliamentary government is not a political mechanism.
It is an instrument through which the Constitution operates and the English
people carry on. A small and compact nation, an orderly social structure,
a high regard for the proprieties, a general agreement upon articles of faith,
a zone of action narrow enough to invite reasonable differences, a determina-
tion to do with decency whatever has to be done -such are the conditions
of its origin and success. The very presence of His Majesty's Opposition
testifies to an orderly establishment, respect for tradition, a closed club
for the elect, a government highly responsive within its severe orbit. But
the conditions which have made for success there do not prevail here; and
the author provides no recipe for beating our far-flung, heterogeneous, turbu-
lent population into a body politic amenable to his prescription. He admits
the failure of the cabinet system outside the British Empire, but attributes
the unfortunate result to the lack of a model equipped with his fancy gadgets.
How his synthetic design can operate beneath the cruel American exposure
he does not tell.
Nor does he realize how evasive is the institution he recommends. The
cabinet system of which Mill and Bagehot wrote is not that of Stanley
Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain. The Victorian was the great age of
parliamentary supremacy. As the decades have passed the legislature has
lost power, the ministry has moved into ascendancy, a rigid discipline has
been imposed upon the M. P. The party can find a place -and even Honors
- for one who serves it faithfully; it can send the rebellious member to
fight for a seat in a hostile constituency; it can even deny him the right to
stand as its candidate. It is true that the Cabinet may turn out the Parliament
or be turned out by it. And, under an older regime, where an unpaid legis-
lative service was a single one among the many duties of a caste, there was
quite a disposition for differences in views to break into the open. But
today, the party whip has its restraining bite; and, for the very reason that
each has power to turn the other out, there are strong reasons for ministry
and legislature to stick together. And, if each holds at the pleasure of the
other, it does not follow that tenure is by popular will. An administration
which in a crisis cari prolong its own life by its own act can hardly be con-
sidered the epitome of representative, or of responsible, government.
How the country comes in is a far more complex matter. Where the party
majority is large, it is only at the expiration of the maximum term of five
years that the people come in at all. A party sure of its hold can choose
its own date for an election and capitalize a passing mood or a favorable
occasion. Thus the current Parliament, now in its eighth year, was returned
on the occasion of George V's jubilee. As for the system insuring an admin-
istration which reflects the crisis, the government which now sits was chosen
on a pledge of disarmament. More than one of the champions of ministerial
control has admitted- Mr. Churchill has on occasion indulged such talk-
that it is a narrow difference within a larger understanding which makes
the thing go. Certainly, when great events impend, the appeal to the country
is given a recess. Thus, in time of war, the ministry in power commutes
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itself into a "coalition government" and, with a few of the opposition as
insiders, carries on. And when domestic issues grow grave, the system is
likely to throw out a queer sport. Memory still recalls a Socialist Prime
Minister as leader of a reactionary administration; and the incident has
enriched the language with the phrase to-pufl-a-ramsay-macdonald. The spirit
of the cabinet system is not in its mechanism; to make it work, you need to
bring along the society to whose needs and values it has been shaped.
And I wonder if Mr. Hazlitt is quite fair to our own system. There are
amongst us uncouth persons- the reviewer confesses to the weakness-
who will say a word now and then for American institutions. Some of us
are even more willing to reform what we have than to make a fresh start.
Certainly the fitness of alien political ways to American needs cannot be
established by acts of faith. Yet the author speculates as to why our M. C.'s
are inferior to a mythical parliament made up of men like "Burke, Cobden,
Macauley and Mill." The question is meaningless, for men are moulded by
the arrangements under which they work and the ways in which they do
things. Different governments attract different sorts of persons and draw
out different qualities. The groups whom he compares are just not com-
parable. I would not exchange my American pick of five for an equal
number whom he might choose from the current parliament. And as for
men of the inferior sort, something is to be said for the crack-pot as against
the slightly animated lump of acquiescence. The spectacle of a resort to
guerilla tactics by a small group of Senators is shocking- but the poll tax
bill did reach the floor. Under the rigid control of Cabinet and Council it
could have been quietly smothered without letting the people in on the
secret.
Nor can the devices under which the rival institutions operate easily be
measured against each other. Office, agency, process are parts of going
schemes of arrangements set in unlike cultures. In terms of place, prestige,
performance, President and Prime Minister belong to different worlds. Our
Executive has a distinctive function; usually he does not come from the
legislature; he is chosen by, and responsible to, the whole people; he brings
from without the freshness and vitality which keeps government from be-
coming formal and stale. If Fillmore, Grant and Harrison were dull, so
were the times that produced them. As the tempo of national life quickens,
we manage to discover men like T. R. and Woodrow Wilson. It is im-
possible to find a least common denominator for cool Calvin and volatile
F.D.R. But the electorate which picked the one would never at the time
have put up with the other. And I am not persuaded that the occasional
failure of the two Houses to pull together threatens the very existence of
the republic. On no important measure does either branch of Congress vote
along strict party lines. We have our own usages for bringing groups which
differ into a working accord; witness the distinctive capacity of the type
now represented by Jimmy Byrnes. Nor does such a breach in a united
front turn up more often than the English system produces its disturbing
anomaly.
It seems to me that Mr. Hazlitt practices magic in his appeal to the
country. The continuity of the agencies of government is not likely to be
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seriously disturbed by changes in administration. Shift parties, and the
British Foreign Office and our own Department of State will continue to
plod along the same old protocol way. The author makes much of the
Minister, who comes in with his party, as the maker, and the Under Secre-
tary, a permanent official, as the executor of policy. Any first year law
student could tell him better. It matters not who phrases the principles;
it is in the series of instances that the general course is set. Mend and
amend our government, if you will. But think twice before you tear up an
indigenous growth to replace it by a synthetic product, however beautifully
it operates in the abstract.
One suspects now and then that Mr. Hazlitt knows a constitution only
by hearsay. He seems to think of it as a theologian would- a document
to be applied and expounded. He has no conception of a group of flexible
and durable usages which need to be accommodated "to the infinite variety
of the changing circumstances of life." As a rigid measuring stick, it has
for him no capacity for growth. If need occurs, he would bring the instru-
ment up-to-date by formal action. But a gloss on the text is sacrilege; and
the progressive leeway by which the instrument is fudged along into a new
statement is to him an usurpation of power. Along the frontier between
individual rights and the province of government, we have of late acquired
a new constitution. The process has been none the less revolutionary because
it has been informal. The result has been to give independence to the legis-
lature and to free public administration from the severe oversight of the
courts. The author does not approve - even though the event has come about
in exactly the way that the cabinet system was shaped to the work it has
to do. If he will quit thinking of the English and the American constitutions
as different sorts of things, he will come nearer to the realistic approach
which his task demands. Until he acquaints himself somewhat with the facts
of political life, he will continue to confuse the British Constitution with the
instruments through which it operates.
These remarks are not intended to question the need for political reform.
We have done rather better at recording with precision the public will than
we have at informing the suffrages which are cast at the polls. The Fathers
were mightily concerned with the place of education and "intelligence" in
the republic. We have gone a very little way in making organs of opinion
- the press, the movies, the radio- instruments of the democratic process.
We tinker with that apparatus of government -executive, cabinet, legisla-
ture-which is a legacy from another age. We do not attack with the
weapons of political theory the newer domains in which public authority
has been established. Necessity has of late brought into being a host of
agencies which are still amorphous, uncertain of their places, not sure of
their tasks. They emerge, almost as of course, as a government, which still
affects to be individualistic, attempts to maintain its authority over a business
system which has gone collectivistic. Our large corporate entities have long
ago ceased to be private affairs. And, as the government attempts to mobilize
the national economy, it enlists these worshipful companies in the public
service. Their executives become public, without ceasing to be corporate,
officials -to an utter confusion in the use of the personal pronoun "we."
[Vo0,.52
REVIEWS
The powers of government are currently exercised through a host of these
new agencies. Some are avowedly public, others are still nominally private;
and in one form or another they are here to stay. There are boards which
depend from a cabinet minister, boards which report directly to Congress,
boards organized as public corporations, boards set up as their subsidiaries,
boards which in name and control are still legally private concerns. And
through the whole amorphous, gigantic structure of government, function is
as diverse as form. The ICC is still a creature of T. R.'s administration;
the RFC carries on as in the days of Herbert Hoover; the SEC is a "New
Deal" agency; the WPB is the very incarnation of the businessman's attempt
to run the war. The corporate estate has been endowed with public authority;
a corresponding responsibility has not yet been imposed upon it. An agency
vital in its beginning is susceptible to the disease of bureaucracy; it may be
taken captive by the very interest it was set up to control. These are samples
of impending problems which cannot be avoided- and as yet they have
hardly been fumbled with. And how can the great questions of state- feed-
ing the people, maintaining the common health, insuring the strength of
the nation- get raised and receive definitive answers? Here is the great
current demand for political invention and discovery -and the author ad-
dresses himself to issues which are academic. The superb example of the
evils Mr. Hazlitt parades is the second Cleveland administration -and it is
too late to do anything practical about that now. If we are to have a new
constitution, it should be for our own age.
VAi.TON HAM!.ILTON't
THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL ADzaINISTRATIVE AGENciES. By
Joseph P. Chamberlain, Noel T. Dowling, and Paul R. Hays. New York:
The Commonwealth Fund, 1942. Pp. xii, 234. $3.00.
THIs volume consists of five essays entitled "Methods," "Policy," "Sanc-
tions," "The Courts," and "Conclusions," synthesized to only a slight extent
by the final chapter.
The chapter on "Methods" classifies cases, discusses informal settlement, and
explains in rather elementary fashion some aspects of formal procedure. The
authors emphasize that "By far the greater number of matters which come
before the agencies are settled informally and never reach the stage of formal
procedure."' "It is in informal conferences and personal visits of investiga-
tion that the education of both government officers and private persons can
best be carried on.'"2 Such observations are all to the good. But one illus-
tration impels me to protest: "In dealing with complaints against railroads
by private parties, the Interstate Commerce Commission has usually been
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able to secure a settlement without formal proceedings." True, more cases
are filed on the informal docket than on the formal docket. But numbers
do not tell the story. Informal complaints are handled by seven clerks and
reviewers whose civil service classifications are somewhat lower than those
of the four score examiners of the Bureau of Formal Cases. Correspondence
methods - not conferences - are used except in those rare instances when
parties on their own initiative come in together. Mediation methods for
complaints against railroads are entirely foreign to the Commission's philoso-
phy. The writers seem to commend for informal methods that part of that
agency which is outstanding for its deficiency in failing to develop adequate
informal methods.
"These informal procedures of settling and adjusting differences are gener-
ally not appropriate in those situations in which the agency is performing a
legislative function, as in rate making, or in which administrative approval
must necessarily precede action by private persons, as in granting a license." 4
But why? Surely this dogmatic conclusion is not supported by experience
with informal procedures. The bulk of rate cases in the ICC, for instance,
readily lend themselves to informal treatment. And a proposal to dispense
with informal procedures for granting licenses is revolutionary and runs
counter to enlightened thought in the field.
"The concept of fair hearing includes the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses." 5 No authority is cited, and Professor Gellhorn's careful analysis
shows that the authorities are conflicting.0 If the authors have new light on
the subject, they do not reveal it.
"The memoranda of the technical assistants must therefore be given a more
formal character and produced at the hearing, where they may be subjected
to the criticism of other parties. 17 If this means that the lawyer-commissioner
cannot secure help from engineers and accountants on his staff when he is
trying to understand the case he is deciding, I think distinctly inferior deci-
sions would result. I wonder whether the practical problem does not demand
more than merely announcing a reaction for or against permitting agency heads
to rely on assistants' memoranda which are not made known to parties;
perhaps some means must be provided for safeguarding parties' rights to rebut
and cross-examine with respect to all facts which concern the parties, at the
same time permitting administrators wide latitude to make full use of technical
staffs in understanding materials in the record, in using information of which
official notice may appropriately be taken, and in developing policies.
The chapter on "Policy," at the risk of expounding the obvious, says much
that probably needs to be said: that Congress expresses policies but that
formulation of policies by agencies is an essential activity; that "a policy
means more than the standards which are to be applied in dealing with par-
ticular cases";" that "the heads of an agency may be appointed with the
3. P. 11, n. 7.
4. Pp. 13-14.
5. P. 24.





object of carrying out a particular policy";" that an agency may develop
policy "through its decisions, its regulations, and, in some agencies, the
opinions of its counsel" 10 (and, the authors might have added, through many
informal activities, through press releases, through initiation of proceedings,
through general investigations, and in other ways); and that agencies are
and should be subject to control through Congress, the courts, and the Presi-
dent.11 On the latter point the authors seem to part company with Sharfman,
who deplores what he denominates "manipulation of the appointing power" 12
to control ICC policy, and even regrets the Hoch-Smith resolution of Congress
as tending "to weaken the system of administrative control, and to hamper,
if not seriously to impair, the independent performance of the Commission's
tasks."'13 Because I believe that, subject to due process restrictions, "expert-
ness" should not prevail over a democratic process which happens to be
articulate on a particular issue, I prefer the conclusions of the present authors
to those of Sharfman. But the authors require the reader to dig for their views
and to shift for himself to find reasons pro and con.
The long chapter on "Sanctions" is especially valuable for its exposition.
Exhortation, education, and propaganda are preliminarily treated, as well
as intermediate and final sanctions, inspection and investigation, and threats
of prosecution in court. The crux lies in "sanctions on specific individual
conduct," some of which are: deportation; the various monetary fines which
at least ten agencies have power to impose; penalties in the guise of taxes;
benefits for approved conduct -tax exemptions, ship subsidies, AAA, Sugar
Act, government loans; withholding of benefits such as social security, aids
to Indians, veterans' pensions; denial of government contracts under such
measures as the Walsh-Healey Act; cancellation of federal deposit insurance;
power to report violations for prosecution in court; publicity; revocation,
suspension and modification of licenses; affirmative orders; prevention,
seizure, destruction, and confiscation; mail fraud orders; cease and desist
orders; and reparations.
In addition, there are "generalized sanctions," which include award of
benefits such as social security, grant of licenses, determination of tax lia-
bilities, land claims adjudicated by the General Land Office.
"Sanctions of this group are not primarily designed to penalize,
reward, or shape the conduct of the individuals involved in par-
ticular determinations. They are methods of working out larger
policies of government, such as regulation of industrial enterprise,
social security, and redistribution of wealth."'14
Here the authors depart from common usage, for such determinations, I
believe, have not generally been thought of as "sanctions." This -novel use
of the term seems less likely to prevail than the earlier suggestion that
9. P. 57.
10. P. 58.
11. P.69 et seq. But at p. 73 the authors flatly state: "Over the policies enforced by
administrative agencies the courts have little control."
12. 2 SHARu-mAN, TE IzTEsrsATE Comimc CozsiussioN (1931) 453.
13. Id. at 472.
14. P. 94.
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sanctions are "methods of shaping unofficial conduct in order to effectuate
official policy." 15
The chapter on "Sanctions" advances one major thesis-that judicial pro-
cedure should be used in many cases where its applicability now is "frequently
overlooked because of the habit of mind that links judicial procedure with
sanctions traditionally imposed by courts."'10 Thus the authors assert that
AAA and sugar benefit payments require "adequate administrative pro-
cedure," observe that "formal administrative procedure is completely lack-
ing" in the administration of government loans, and declare: "Only the
formal distinction between sanctions of the benefit type and such sanctions
as denial or withdrawal of a license can explain - and such distinctions
cannot justify- the difference in required procedure."'1 This cryptic con-
clusion is unsupported by analysis of advantages and disadvantages of formal
procedures. Here is typical reasoning:
"Where the claim is by the government in connection with the
revenue, the judicial nature of the determination adverse to the
taxpayer is similarly recognized. The absence of requirements for
formal procedure when the determination is to grant the applica-
tion is based upon the possibility of safeguarding the public interest
by procedure within the administrative agencies. Where the statute
clearly specifies the standards so that there is a minimum of admin-
istrative discretion, the propriety of leaving the determination to
internal administrative procedures is reasonably clear. However,
where a determination in favor of a claimant involves the exercise
of relatively unguided discretion and especially where the deter-
mination concerns matters of great importance such as, for example,
large tax refunds, a noncontroversial judicial procedure provides
more effective safeguards for the public interest. Frauds on the relief
agencies may be left to police methods and punitive sanctions, but
Teapot Domes could be profitably avoided by formal requirements
as to methods of determination."' 8
I question the soundness of the authors' thesis concerning judicial procedure
for several reasons. I believe the degree of administrative discretion is not
the proper criterion for determining the propriety of judicial procedure.
Government loans and benefit payments seem to me to call for over-the-
counter methods. And I believe that when government officers and the
only private party involved are in agreement a judicial procedure is non-
sensical. Furthermore, I think one must deal with concrete realities and not
with such abstract and undefined phrases as "noncontroversial judicial pro-
cedure." A noncontroversial judicial procedure when all concerned are in
harmony "must mean that a file will be orally read to a court reporter in a




18. P. 158. At some other places more rigorous stylistic editing would have been
in order. E.g., p. 162: "Where the purpose of licensing is restriction of competition,
there is a further interest in the desirability of granting the privilege at all, particularly
where there are prior licensees."
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I approve the authors' disapproval of "the 'cock fight' aspect of judicial
procedure,"'19 but the authors should not stop with a neat phrase and a
broadside statement of the wish. How does one go about achieving the
ideal? Eliminate oaths? Curtail cross-examination? Replace oral testimony
with written evidence? Relax rules of evidence? Do something about plead-
ings, motions, briefs, oral arguments? Somehow alter practitioners' psy-
chology or strategy?
The chapter on "The Courts" deals primarily with methods of review, with-
out mentioning: Professor McAllister's excellent article on "Statutory Roads
to Review of Federal Administrative Orders,"20 primary jurisdiction,2 ex-
clusive jurisdiction,22 non-reviewability, - 3 exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies,24 declaratory judgments, negative orders,2 or the Bassett case26 which
casts doubt upon Crowell v. Benson.2 7 The authors assume that of course
the cornerstone of judicial review is still Crowdl v. Benson, which, even apart
from the Bassett case, seems to me questionable. The reliance is upon judi-
cial language, with hardly a glimmer of the frequency with which judicial
motivation and action depart from judicial language, especially on questions
of scope of review.m Nevertheless, the compilation of authorities is a useful
one. A section on "Constitutional Background for Statutory Development"
reviews the Morgan and other cases.
The chapter entitled "Conclusions" contains an able and realistic account
of reasons for and against the combination of prosecuting and judging func-
tions. Earlier discussions are summarized. The treatment of sanctions is
more than a recapitulation:
"The use of that cluster of controls which is designated supervision
and which includes inspection, investigation, consultation, education,
advice, cooperation, and the like is becoming increasingly the method
of government regulation as against the policing and judicial pro-
cedure." 29
The book is a significant addition to the literature of administrative law,
even though the small volumes by Landis and Gellhorn surpass it in original-
ity and in stimulating qualities, and even though in some respects some of
its predecessors in the Commonwealth Fund series-Freund, Henderson,
Van Vleck, Sharfman, and Dodd - may have delved more deeply.
KENNETH CuLt DAvist
19. P. 158.
20. (1940) 28 CALIF. L. REv. 129.
21. E.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
22. E.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co., 303 U. S. 41 (1933).
23. E.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940).
24. See, e.g., Berger, Exhaustion 'of Administratie Remedics (1939) 48 YALn
L. J. 981.
25. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U. S. 125 (1939).
26. South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251 (1940).
27. 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
28. E.g., United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475 (1942);
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292 (1939).
29. P. 224.
'Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School.
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PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Stefan
A. Riesenfeld. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1942. Pp. 296. $2.00.
THIS book was written for the specific purpose of furnishing a foundation
upon which to build a solution of a problem of the utmost urgency. The
stake is the perpetuation of important parts of a natural resource, ocean
fisheries - estimated to produce annually ten pounds of nutritious food for
each man, woman, and child in the world. The future of this invaluable
resource is imperiled by the application of the so-called "three mile rule,"
that a nation can protect fisheries only to the distance of three miles offshore,
although its coastal fisheries may in fact extend as far as a hundred miles.
The question submitted was whether international law precluded any relief.
In past ages ocean fisheries were generally believed to be inexhaustible.
But in recent years, with modern development of vessel power, fishing
appliances, and refrigeration, fishing vessels have operated across the widest
oceans; and, as a result, valuable fisheries have been definitely threatened
with commercial exhaustion by the intrusion of foreigners indifferent to
their preservation. Thus, in 1936, the Japanese asserted the right to pursue
unrestricted any method of fishing anywhere, no matter how destructive
of the future supply, as long as they stayed three miles offshore. Conse-
quently, the great salmon fishery of the Pacific Northwest was in danger of
destruction. Many believed that, in addition to fishing, the Japanese were
surreptitiously surveying our waters.
Protests against the Japanese brought to their defense two American
groups: those who openly sympathized with Japan, and those who considered
the "three mile rule" sacrosanct and the Japanese therefore within their
rights. With the belief that investigation would disclose that the sanctity
of this rule was a myth, and that, with proper understanding of the past,
future progress would be facilitated, the Institute of Pacific Relations was
induced to promote a research program. Two legal publications resulted: an
argumentative brochure by Dr. Joseph Walter Bingham, entitled Report on
the International Law of Pacific Coastal Fisheries, published by the Stanford
University Press in 1938; and the work of Dr. Riesenfeld just off the press.
In spite of the dates of publication, Dr. Bingham's argument was in fact
largely based upon the research conducted by Dr. Riesenfeld.
The present work is in three parts. Part I, "International Legal Theory,"
reviews the legal controversies from Roman times to the present over free-
dom of the seas. Much attention is devoted to Hugo Grotius, often credited
as being the founder of modern international law. This part presents a
thorough and most interesting chronological analysis of the position of each
significant international law writer who had dealt with the subject, ever
since the Dutch initiated the conception that a nation owned a strip of water
as far out as a cannon could shoot -an idea which some nations conven-
tionalized into the three mile rule.
Part II, "State Practice," attempts to summarize the actual position
asserted by law and diplomatic practice of each of the four geographical
groups into which the author divides Europe, and of each American nation.
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Part III, "International Arbitrations," considers the international adjudi-
cations which have been claimed to involve the three mile rule.
A conclusion summarizes and interprets the three parts. Little doubt is
left that there is not and never has been any harmony of opinion among
text writers, nor any uniformity of practice among nations, concerning the
rights in or extent of territorial waters. Nor have adjudications been at all
conclusive of the universality of the three mile rule.
"What, then, is the solution?" Dr. Riesenfeld answers his ovn question
as follows:
"In the opinion of the writer, the answer to this question can be
found only in the application of international law as a means of
adjustment of the various national interests in the spirit of a com-
munity of nations. On the one hand, there exists no mechanical
three-mile rule which, regardless of the interests involved, is appli-
cable under all circumstances and for all purposes. On the other
hand, there cannot be complete anarchy. Therefore, if it can be
assumed justly that coastal fishing grounds, owing to their primordial
importance for coastal states and owing to the very imminent danger
of their complete destruction resulting from the employment of
piratical techniques by distant nations, can be adequately preserved
only by control and exclusive exploitation by the coastal state, inter-
national law must and does recognize the right to such control and
exploitation by the coastal state, unless the vested, long standing
rights of other nations are thereby infringed. This seems to be the
only way in which important food supplies for mankind can be
preserved, and, unless international law is to be regarded as a sense-
less and dead body of rules, a reasonable claim to coastal fisheries
by the coastal state for conservation purposes is no breach, but fully
in accord with international law."'
In a rapidly changing world, international law must conform to changed
conditions. So vital a natural resource as fisheries must be conserved even
at the expense of venerable concepts. Dr. Riesenfeld demonstrates that the
way is open.
EDWARD W. AttE.it
THE EcoxomIcs OF TOTAL W¥AR. By Henry V. Spiegel. New York and
London: Appleton-Century, 1942. Pp. xiv, 410. $3.00.
Ix this work Professor Spiegel deals with a wide variety of topics, in-
cluding the economic causes of war; its economic significance; the material
and human resources of the participants; changed relationships between
nations; and the maladjustments in our economy that war produces. Al-
l. P. 282.
I Chairman, International Fisheries Commission.
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though the book is recommended to those who desire an over-all picture, it
is the opinion of the reviewer, nevertheless, that many dissents will be forth-
coming from the critical reader. In particular places exposition seems to
masquerade as argument in the sense that an enlightening statement of what
has been done is confused with its justification. Elsewhere proof seems to
be attempted by a statement of the conditions that would have to prevail
if a certain result were to follow and then to imply without direct assertion
that these conditions do not prevail. To illustrate these points I shall single
out one chapter, "How To Pay For The War."
In this chapter the author is quick to demonstrate that, in the present
conflict, our country will be unable to borrow (in net amounts) from other
nations and thus postpone the burden of the war for future generations of
taxpayers. Whatever borrowing we do must be from ourselves. All that
can be done by borrowing, therefore, is to determine the way in which the
war's burden will be borne by different classes of our citizenry. With this
point conceded, as of course it must be, the problem becomes that of choosing
the most equitable method of distributing the burden. Herein the more or
less consistent position of the author is that those who make the contribu-
tions in the present should be in a position to recover from the rest of society
in the future. Sympathy therefore is generally expressed with the policy of
making generous wage payments to workers so that out of their pay envelopes
they may become creditors of the war effort. To avoid dangers of price
inflation it will be proper to compel the payment of a part of their wages in
currently non-spendable bonds. Among other considerations, so it is argued,
such a policy will help to provide the purchasing power needed to sustain
employment when the war is over.
In my opinion we may quickly rule out of the argument all that part which
bears upon the possession by present bond-buyers of purchasing power in
the post-war period. It will be easy enough then to provide purchasing power
to the extent that is required. There is no certainty that the encashment and
spending of war bonds in the future may not be carried to an extent that
will make our economy uncontrollable. The basic question at issue seems to
be whether heavy reliance upon bonds of any sort instead of upon taxes will
contribute to distributive fairness. In the reviewer's opinion a policy of
carrying taxation as far as can be will lead to more equitable results.
When the soldierp and sailors return from the conflict they will find them-
selves debtors of the war's burden. No matter whether a soldier is well or
poorly paid, he will be unlikely to acquire any large amount of bonds. Those
who run the risk of death in battle cannot be expected to save. In the future,
therefore, they will be taxpayers primarily and not bondholders. A portion
of the products of their future toil will be wrung from them to meet the
interest on the bonds purchased by the stay-at-homes. Veterans in the future
will be quick to recognize the injustice of this state of affairs. Their demands
will carry tremendous influence in politics. It is my guess that if the debt
we inherit after hostilities amounts to 150 billions of dollars the minimum
demands for the average soldier's bonus will amount to ten thousand dollars.
Multiply ten thousand by- perhaps- ten million, and you have an addition
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to our debt of 100 billions. To the total debt of 250 billions add such further
debt as may have to be incurred in order to sustain employment in the post-
war period and you may easily find the debt umnanageable. Taxes may have
to be employed of a type and amount that will compel neglect of any principle
of equity.
The only possible answer to this criticism of the bond program that is
found in the work under review is the contention that a debt we ourselves
own is not a burden upon the people as a whole. Although everyone agrees
that a distinction must be made between an external and an internal debt,
I for one take the position that the consequences of a large internal debt
cannot be lightly waved aside. There is every likelihood that it vill require
a type of taxation in the future that will be highly discouraging to enterprise
and endanger our ability to operate the existing economic system.
The above criticisms apply to the policy of selling bonds to savers. Bonds
sold to banks are open to severer objection. They tend to expand the circu-
lating medium with the consequence of inducing inflationary movements in the
price level. Any pronounced price rise impairs the efficiency of the war effort
by destroying the only standards we have of fair prices and fair wages-
those that prevailed before the wax- and contributes to strikes, disgruntle-
ment, and contract-bickering. It is highly important therefore that we gauge
the extent to which bank credit expansion resulting from bond sales to banks
will affect prices. In the author's analysis of this question complacency in
the face of the inflationary danger is at least implicit. On pages 338-339,
Mr. Spiegel states the conditions under which bank credit expansion will
be inflationary. Few readers will fail to carry away the impression that
these conditions are regarded as special and exceptional. I would ask
the reader, however, to determine for himself if they do not correspond
closely to reality. The conditions outlined, moreover, all have to do with
the demand side of the market. Neglect of supply conditions is of course
indefensible. High wages put up costs, and it is only by expensive subsidies
that it will be found possible to produce goods for any sustained period at
less than output costs. High money wages, however, are the result of making
dollars plentiful by the device of issuing bonds to banks.
The reviewer must also take exception to the statement (on pages 336-337)
that the Federal Reserve proposals of January, 1941, "were designed to
create an artificial scarcity of bank credit and to raise interest rates!' I
think these proposals were intended only to give the authorities power to
mop up a portion of our credit expansion potentiale and to make it clearer to
our procurement agencies that dollars must be spent economically.
The principles of sound war finance are simple. They are, first, to raise
funds in such a way as will help mobilize our economy for war; second, to
pay out as little as possible for what is procured; third, to take out of circula-
tion as much purchasing power as may be without destroying effectiveness.
Total war is not a parlor game. In any sound policy some place will have
to be found for bonds, but not the amount the reader might complacently
assume after reading this volume. The combination of high vages and com-
pulsory bond buying has certain advantages over other objectionable devices.
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But it itself is by no means ideal. It has the terrific drawback of inspiring
contentment in the face of a tremendous increase in our debt. There is no
substitute for careful spending and for as severe taxation as can be laid
down. HAROLD L. REEDt
CITY LAWYER, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A LAW PRAcTICE. By Arthur Gar-
field Hays. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942. Pp. xvii, 482. $3.00.
MR. Hays insists that "This is more the biography of a law practice than
of its practitioner" and that, although he does not hesitate to write of his
experiences, "assuredly I am not important enough to write of me." This
reviewer feels that Mr. Hays is sufficiently important to this world in which
we live to write about himself without hesitation. But whether it is about
his practice or himself that Mr. Hays has written- and there is a great
deal of both in this book- every page makes eager reading. The tempo
changes and the scenes shift quickly, but the themes recur and from the
pages emerges the picture of a successful "big city" lawyer who has not
forgotten that the practice of law is more than the winning of cases and the
collecting of large fees.
The opening chapter rushes the reader through a day at Mr. Hays' office
- not a typical day, perhaps, but a fair picture of the juggling technique
which a successful New York City attorney must acquire. In the remaining
chapters of the first two parts of the book- "Biographical" and "Somewhat
Biographical"- Mr. Hays proceeds at a more leisurely pace to fill in the
background of his practice- the early years before the first World War,
the war years at home and abroad, and the established lawyer representing
great corporations and wealthy clients. The chapter on "Getting Started"
will be of particular interest to law students and young lawyers struggling
for a foothold in their chosen profession. Mr. Hays uses his own experiences
to illustrate his belief that "Assuming that you know your business and are
reasonably diligent, the gods of luck will make or break you," but the reader
will not fail to see that Mr. Hays forced his luck by means of courageous
and difficult decisions and by refusing to "let well enough alone." He
could have remained in the comparative security of the well-established firm
in which he began his legal career. Instead, he risked his bread and butter
in forming, with two of his classmates, a new firm each member of which,
as Mr. Hays puts it, "conversationally had a clientele." Having succeeded
in this venture, Mr. Hays could have devoted his entire attention to the
demands of his numerous corporate and other well-paying clients. But again
he refused to "let well enough alone" and in the third part of his book, aptly
called "Salt in a Law Practice," we find the activities which have flavored
Mr. Hays' practice and enriched it far beyond that of most other success-
ful New York lawyers of his time.
Mr. Hays' defense of the rights and liberties of the individual has ex-
tended from the so-called "Negro covenant" clause in real estate deeds to
the Reichstag-fire trial. He has not missed many of the famous civil liberties
cases of this century- the Sacco-Vanzetti case, the Scopes anti-evolution
tProfessor of Economics, Cornell Univrs.t3.
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trial, Tom Mooney, the Scottsboro Negroes, and one of the earlier Jehovah's
Witnesses cases are among those in which he has been an active participant.
His reminiscences about these cases make fascinating reading, and his com-
ments on civil liberties in general go far to explain his active defense of them
under any and all conditions and circumstances.
In a brief concluding chapter Mr. Hays attempts to define or at least to
describe "Our Kind"-an expression used by Clarence Darrow in intro-
ducing friends to Mr. Hays: "Dear Art, Here's one of our kind." Mr.
Hays conceives his kind to be men of good will, tolerant of all save intol-
erance, and generous of their time and energy in the defense of freedom.
This reviewer sincerely hopes that this book will find its way into every
Army camp and Naval training station in this country. The men there
are now being called upon to defend with their lives the very things for
which Mr. Hays has been fighting in the courts. If these men can return
to private life with an enhanced appreciation of these rights for which they
fought, from their ranks will emerge many of Mr. Hays' kind to carry on
an unremitting fight for the importance of the individual and his right to
think what he wishes, to say what he thinks, and to live his life as he sees
fit within the framework of a liberal society.
HEmY A. FWNN
BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE. Edited by George E.
Woodbine. Volume IV. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942. Pp.
378. $7.50.
IN the review of Volume III of this work in the April, 1941, YALE. LAW.
JOURNAL,' there was an attempt "to look both backward and forward" - to
summarize the achievement since the first volume was published in 1915
to the present, and also the plan which Professor Woodbine had in mind for
its completion. It seems unnecessary to repeat what has been stated so
recently. The appearance of volume IV in April of this year corresponds
closely to the prediction then made.
As this volume completes the text, containing approximately the last third,
the editor comments briefly upon the work and refers to some of his state-
ments made twenty-seven and twenty years ago. He wishes particularly to
stress that what appears to be the best text "from the standpoint of law or
history or language" is not necessarily that which stands closest to Bracton.
"Bracton would have to have been more than human not to have made the
same kind of mistakes and the same kind of slips that writers today make,
mistakes that all the more easily could have gone undetected because he did
not have the benefit of printer and proofreaders to help him correct them." 2
Twiss appears to have adopted the principle that the "purer," the more
accurate, text must be nearer to Bracton, although this theory ignores the
fact that glossators and copyists of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries lived in a maturing law and a ripening erudition. But Professor
Woodbine's purpose throughout has been to bring us as close as possible
tAssistant Dean, Yale Law School.
L White, Book Review (1941) 50 YAt.x L. J. 1134.
2. P.Lx.
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to Bracton - probably not closer at any point than a manuscript in the third
generation from the autograph. He hews to this line, let the slips fall where
they may. In so doing, he has found himself justified in holding to the three
principal traditions into which he grouped the manuscripts as the result of
that tremendous study, "the pedigree of the manuscripts," which occupied his
first volume. He has found it impossible by emendation or selections from
variants to reconstruct the original. And all later study has confirmed his
initial conclusion "that the tradition represented by group I gives us what
is, basically at least, an early text which is older than most of the addiciones,
and older than many of the corrections and alterations made probably by
Bracton himself.' '3 Furthermore, it can now be stated definitely that the
unidentified T. N., editor of the first printed edition (1569), told the truth
when he claimed that he did not reproduce any one manuscript and that he
collated some twelve which were available at that time. This is an interesting
addition to much other evidence that there was sound historical scholarship
in the mid-Tudor period. This text was followed in the edition of 1640 and
also, with but slight change, by Twiss. It has been referred to by scholars
as the "vulgate," and now we have some knowledge of its sources.
This last third of the text is wholly in the English part, based on the
court rolls and Bracton's own long experience as judge. He writes as a
master. He is free from Rome and from Azo, within whose precincts, it
has had to be acknowledged, he at times wandered in a world but very im-
perfectly realized. There is less theory and philosophy, more sound stuff
and readability. As Maitland remarked, the most learned parts of Bracton
are the worst. Learned in a different sense are such later great divisions as
novel disseisin, entry, writ of right, essoins, warranty, and finally exceptions,
the last that he wrote. Quid sit exceptio, he says at the start of this last;
and then with clarity and fulness he tells of the curious, incidental, but now
thoroughly domesticated exceptio, which was already having, and was still
more to have, a profound influence on procedure and even on the substance
of law. Here Bracton was at his best, treating "a practical legal problem in
a lawyerly way." Bracton was Janus-faced: Roman inspiration and his own
instincts led him to organization and rationalization; but from a deep im-
mersion in a practical, vital, growing law, he looked towards a law of prece-
dent, judge-made and jury-made, to be endlessly elaborated and "toughened"
in the Year Books and Inns of Court. To watch these two forces, which
Bracton projected into the future, as alternating influences in all later English
history illuminates much and proves the greatness of the work to which
Professor Woodbine devotes his life.
"The next volume will be one of notes and commentary, much of the
material for which is already collected. It will contain also the addenda and
corrigenda for the preceding volumes, which matter has been reserved till
this time in order that it might profit, in completeness, from the thorough
use of the text which the notes and commentary will necessitate." 4
ALBERT B. Wiin t
3. P. x-m.
4. P.xi.
tProfessor of History, University of Minnesota.
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